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CHAPTER 1
PROCUREMENT RISK MANAGEMENT IN
BEEF SUPPLY CHAINS
Onur Boyabatlı1, Paul R. Kleindorfer2 and Stephen R. Koontz3
1Lee Kong Chian School of Business, Singapore Management University
2Paul Dubrule Professor of Sustainable Development, INSEAD
3Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Colorado State University
1.1 INTRODUCTION
The purpose of the present paper is to develop a basis for understanding
the tradeoﬀs facing a meat processing company (hereafter a “packer”) in the
choice of alternative arrangements for sourcing fed cattle, when that packer
acts as a wholesaler into several ﬁnal product markets. The general question
posed is: what might inﬂuence a packer to source from long-term contracts
versus spot markets as the basis for procurement of fed cattle when there are
uncertainties and substitution possibilities in the demand for the resulting beef
products supplied by the packer? Our focus is on the United States (U.S.)
beef industry, which is the largest single industry within U.S. agriculture,
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generating between $34 and $37 billion per year in 2006-2008 and accounting
for 20% of the annual total market value of agricultural products sold in the
U.S. (USDA, 2009). A similar analysis would apply to other cattle producing
regions of the world that rely for fed-cattle procurement on a mix of spot
markets and long-term contracts (e.g. Europe and South America).
As shown in Figure 1.1, the beef industry is a combination of assembly and
disassembly and of product ﬂow smoothing. The base production unit in the
industry - the beef cow herd - lives outdoors and consumes grass-based forage.
The capital requirement in land is enormous and is the main reason why the
cattle industry has not and will likely never integrate or consolidate. Beef
cows produce a single calf per year and the large majority of calves are born
in spring. Calves grow with the mother cow on grass pasture and are weaned
in the fall. At this time the ﬁrst major assembly occurs. Weaned calves are
marketed through a multitude of auction barns and direct trade. Groups
of calves are comingled and moved to so-called “backgrounding” operations.
The purpose of backgrounding operations is to provide inexpensive animal
growth on forage-based systems. Backgrounding operations include pasturing
on growing winter wheat in the southern high plains, pasturing on stockpiled
standing grasses, and feeding on inexpensive forages in conﬁned operations.
The length of backgrounding is highly variable, depending on the feeding
regime. This variation in length of backgrounding is the primary means of
smoothing the ﬂow of cattle to packers.
Figure 1.1 Typical Production System and Timeline in Beef Supply Chain
(GIPSA Report, 2007)
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The second major assembly occurs after backgrounding. After obtaining
cheap growth of the animal frame, the animals are referred to as “feeder
cattle” and are assembled by the cattle feeding industry. Feeder animals feed
for 4-6 months depending on seasonal factors (such as energy requirements
due to living outdoors and seasonal demand for beef consumption) and grain
prices relative to beef prices. Finished animals are referred to as “fed cattle”
and are marketed to packers.
As reported in the GIPSA Report (2007), there are some 25 large com-
mercial fed cattle slaughtering and processing facilities in the U.S. And it is
here that disassembly begins. Each animal can be used to produce a subset of
hundreds of standard beef cuts. Further, excess fat is blended with lean beef
trimmings - largely from the slaughter of non-fed beef animals which include
cull beef cows and bulls - to produce a number of beef products. These are
packaged as premium products (program boxed beef) or commodity products
(commodity boxed beef). Finally, each animal is used to produce a subset
of by-products. The largest by-product is the hide which is tanned for use
as leather. The disassembly process continues through the beef distribution
system. Food service such as restaurant chains may procure program beef.
Grocery stores market a variety of commodity beef. There are distinct diﬀer-
ences in regional demands across the U.S. and there is also a distinct variation
in seasonal demands for types of beef products.
Beef markets have several interlinked markets that operate to determine
pricing and delivery quantities at various stages along the supply chain. We
will focus on the two markets of greatest interest to packers (see Figure 1.2):
1. The market between Processors/Packers and all upstream elements (in-
cluding feedlots and prior elements) of the beef value chain;
2. The market between Processors/Packers and all downstream elements
(including Wholesalers and Retailers) of the beef value chain.
Considering the upstream elements in the beef supply chain, there are
actually two markets of interest: the spot market and the contract market.
Spot markets (also referred to as cash markets) are real-time regional mar-
kets for transactions of fed cattle, often through auctions. In keeping with the
extensive literature on the subject, e.g. GIPSA Report (2007), we will assume
throughout that spot markets are competitive, i.e. the price is not sensitive
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Figure 1.2 Upstream and Downstream Elements for Meatpackers in Beef Supply
Chain
to the actions of any of the agents (Buyers or Sellers) who participate in this
market.
Contract markets feature longer-term arrangements between feedlot own-
ers and packers. The contracts themselves are often referred to as “marketing
agreements”. Such agreements may allow some ﬂexibility in the quantity de-
livered, in the usual options form, or have more advanced features in pricing
of yield risks (grid or formula-based) than ﬁxed forwards based on, e.g., sim-
pler live-weight metrics. The particular contract form analyzed below is the
most common in the industry. It speciﬁes the price per unit on the basis of
the spot price prevailing at a speciﬁed market on delivery day. The usual
form of this arrangement is that contract price equals spot price plus a ﬁxed
surcharge. The ﬁxed surcharge is intended to cover the cost of additional
feeding speciﬁcations that are part of the contract and, which give rise to
the additional value of contract cattle resulting from the higher percentage of
premium product (program beef) in these cattle. Contract cattle can also be
resold in the spot market by the contracting packer, if they are not needed
for production.
As noted in Kleindorfer and Wu (2003), in many organized commodity
markets, a substantial portion of a Seller’s output or Buyer’s input is typi-
cally contracted for well in advance of delivery, with contract-based input in
excess of 80% of total input, and where the spot market acts primarily as
a topping up and hedge market. In contrast, for meatpackers in the U.S.,
the spot market is a very important source of physical supply, averaging for
many meatpackers in excess of 60% of total supply according to GIPSA Re-
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port (2007), undertaken for the Grain, Inspection, Packers and Stockyard
Administration (GIPSA) of the U.S. Department of Agriculture. This report
provides the basic background and data for the computational experiments
reported in this paper. The heavy reliance on the spot market noted in the
GIPSA Report is driven in part by the large number of small producers of
cattle, who raise cattle as complements to their other farming activities, and
the fact that spot sales in organized markets are an eﬃcient way of bringing
such cattle to market. Contract purchases obtained from larger feedlots oﬀer
certain advantages to packers such as the ability to contract for and moni-
tor special feeding regimes that are intended to increase the quality of meat
produced.
For the upstream market between a given packer and its suppliers (see
Figure 2), the appropriate model would be one in which, following Wu and
Kleindorfer (2005), a uniform product is provided by multiple suppliers char-
acterized by heterogeneous costs (with quality diﬀerences captured in these
costs as adjustments to the “full price” of a standard product). As our focus
is on the integration of upstream and downstream markets, we will treat the
upstream contract market as a single aggregate supplier, ignoring the details
of how equilibrium price in this contract market is determined. We also as-
sume that neither the cattle nor the ﬁnished products can be inventoried–they
have a certain “ripe” or sale date towards which all contracting is directed.
For the downstream market between Packers and Buyers (see Figure 2),
model features that are important include: a multi-product model (each unit
of upstream product yields a certain number of units of saleable downstream
products); with some quality diﬀerences between contract and spot purchases.
Plant utilization is a critical issue for packers as their production technology
(and our model) exhibits strong economies of scale.
Focusing on a single packer, we consider the optimal mix of contract and
spot purchases in providing input from upstream feedlots and spot markets.
Once delivered or purchased, these cattle are processed immediately and con-
verted into the two beef products of interest, a premium product (program
beef) and a standard product (commodity beef). As in the co-production
literature (e.g., Bitran and Gilbert, 1994), there is downward substitution in
production in that all meat suitable for sale as premium product can be con-
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verted into the standard product. The downstream market into which the
packer sells is price sensitive, and price is assumed to adjust to the quantity
of both products sold into this market. As described in the GIPSA Report
(2007), the market for beef products is competitive, so that the ﬁrm-speciﬁc
price elasticity of demand for any given packer is large. At the market level,
price adjusts quickly to clear all meat product and fed-cattle input markets.
Further, meat product markets are closely related given the evident substitu-
tion eﬀects between meat products. Imbalances in any individual market have
impacts on other markets. Considerable volatility (both seasonal and product-
based) exists in beef product and cattle markets and price-based clearance at
the market level is critical.
In our companion paper, Boyabatlı et al. (2010), we develop the theoretical
model and provide the optimal solution for the procurement portfolio of the
packer.1 The current paper describes the computational results for the above
model based on data for the US beef industry described in the GIPSA Re-
port (2007), and complemented by industry demand and supply studies. Our
analysis is focused on determining the impact on the optimal procurement
portfolio of spot price and demand uncertainty, the degree of substitution
between products in ﬁnal markets, as well as the cost characteristics of the
packer and the nature of quality and cost diﬀerences in the contract and
spot markets.2 As the focus is on the short and medium term, capacity and
processing technology are assumed ﬁxed.
This paper intends to make the following contributions. It provides insights
about integrated risk management of input and output risks for the central
player in the beef supply chains, the packer. Using a calibration based on the
GIPSA Report (2007), the paper provides a foundation for understanding the
complementary roles of contract and spot markets. In particular, the paper
elucidates for the ﬁrst time the value of contracting in the beef supply chain.
As reviewed in the next section, this has been a point of considerable con-
troversy in the policy debate concerning the structure and operations of the
1The theoretical model developed in Boyabatlı et al. (2010) focuses on a more general
contract form, a special case of which is the marketing agreement contract analyzed in this
paper.
2A part of these computational results are also reported in Boyabatlı et al. (2010) some of
which are further generalized with analytical proofs.
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beef industry. In characterizing the structure of the optimal sourcing portfolio
from a supply chain perspective, this paper provides an important contribu-
tion to the on-going debate on this issue. Beyond these contributions speciﬁc
to the beef supply chain, our results also indicate the value of integrated risk
management across marketing, sourcing and supply chain decisions.
The paper proceeds as follows. We review relevant literature in the next
section. Thereafter follows our model description in §1.3. §1.4 provides nu-
merical simulations to illustrate the comparative statics of model results for
processing, product market and spot market parameters of interest. We con-
clude in §1.5 with a discussion of our managerial insights and the path forward
for future research.
1.2 LITERATURE REVIEW
There is a rich literature in agricultural economics and operations manage-
ment ﬁelds that considers supply chain contracting in the presence of spot
markets. We refer the readers to Boyabatlı et al. (2010) for a review of the re-
lated literature from the operations management ﬁeld. In this section, we will
focus on the literature in the ﬁeld of agricultural economics and management
covering the beef industry. However, very little of this literature addresses
supply chain management questions in a direct manner. This literature re-
view will discuss some of the broader agricultural economic research, linking
this to supply chain management questions addressed in the paper. There are
three broad areas of relevant literature: demand analysis, supply modeling,
and the eﬃciency of pricing methods for marketing agreements.
Concerning the demand side of the beef markets, estimation of demand3
elasticities are critical for market and policy analysis. Demand is inelastic
so small changes in quantities result in relatively large impact at the market
level. There is considerable volatility in livestock and meat prices. Further,
meat demand is intrinsically variable. Red meat demand expanded consid-
erably with the expanding U.S. economy and incomes during the 1960s and
1970s. However, health concerns and a number of other factors contributed
3The industry standard for demand modeling is the Almost Ideal Demand System of Deaton
and Muellbauer (1980). It is used in almost all the work referenced and has been found to
produce elasticities with desirable forecasting properties (Kastens and Brester, 1996).
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to sharp declines in red meat demand following 1980. This decline in demand
continued until 1998 and placed considerable economic pressure on the red
meats industries.4 Improving red meat demand in the late 1990s has been
well documented (e.g. Marsh, 2003). However, solid identiﬁcation of the
causes is not. The consumption of food away from home - or food prepared
away from home - increases across the past years. Health related concerns
appear to be less, specialized preparation appears to be better, improvements
in meat processing and technology appear to be better, or some combination,
and have resulted in increased red meat demand along with the increase in
food not-prepared at home. The GIPSA Report (2007) suggests that market-
ing agreement transaction methods (the contract market in our model) have
emerged to address meat quality problems that are not addressable through
the federal government developed grades and standards. The ﬁndings of these
studies above are used to synthesize reasonable elasticities for program versus
commodity beef in the numerical simulations reported in this paper.
Concerning the supply side of beef markets, estimation of supply elastici-
ties and the associated dynamic properties are critical for market and policy
analysis. There are a large number of independent decision makers, the pro-
duction process - the growth and development of beef animals - is lengthy, and
the behavior by decision makers is in part anticipatory. A signiﬁcant litera-
ture has examined the dynamic properties of supply functions at the various
stages of cattle and beef production.5
Another important area of the supply-related literature addresses technical
progress within the beef industry and increased productivity. For example,
the additional pounds of beef produced per animal in the breeding herd have
increased 25% over the past 20 years. There are also been large changes in
meat processing technology, changes and reductions in organized labor, and
changes in provision of marketing service. These eﬀects are slower but have
substantial impacts on markets over time. The increase in productivity has
4See, for example, Braschler (1983), Chavas (1983), Dahlgran (1987), Moschini and Meilke
(1989), Verbeke and Ward (2001) and Boetel and Liu (2003).
5Initial supply modeling work includes Reutlinger (1966) and Nelson and Spreen (1974),
and the later work by Marsh (1983, 1984, and 1994).
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maintained the total volume of beef production with a signiﬁcant reduction
in the size of the breeding herd.6
A ﬁnal extensive and important supply-related literature addresses long-
term investment in the cattle industry and the resulting cattle cycle dynamics
(e.g., Schmitz, 1997). There are inherent diﬃculties in modeling farm-level
supply decisions and it may be that examining the herd building and liquida-
tion decision itself is more useful. The cycle persists because there are cycle
reinforcing actions and because expectations are still to a large part adaptive.
The reinforcing actions are that when prices are relatively high and economic
returns are favorable then returning additional young female animals to the
herd and keeping additional cows in the herd exacerbates the high prices.
Likewise, when prices are relatively low and economic returns are poor then
selling young female animals into the meat production system and culling cows
exacerbates the low prices. Further, expectation formation by beef producers
have been found to be largely adaptive and not forward-looking (Antonoviz
and Green, 1990). Generally, the study of the cattle cycle is important but
has provided no simple rules as far as the predictability of the cycle.
On the eﬃciency of pricing methods in the beef markets, the pricing mecha-
nisms for alternative marketing arrangements7 such as marketing agreements
have been a more resent research interest in the agricultural economics liter-
ature. All of this research is focused on determining welfare implications to
suppliers based on the prospect of the exercise of market power by downstream
procuring Buyers. Comprehensive supply chain management issues and the
optimal contracting behavior of the meatpacker, the focus of this paper, have
not been examined in detail in this literature.
Within producer groups, policy making and some government agency cir-
cles non-spot market procurement arrangements are referred to as captive
supplies. These captive supplies are also referred to as contract supplies or
marketing agreement cattle. These contracts are often more than simple
forward contracts. Forward contracts comprise 5% of fed cattle transacted
whereas the largest non-cash market arrangements are marketing agreements
6See, for example, Kuchler and McCelland (1989), Mullen et al. (1988), and Brester and
Marsh (2001).
7The “alternative” refers to an alternative to the cash or spot market.
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with formula pricing, in which the price paid for cattle is determined based on
the amounts of each of type of beef actually present in the processed carcass.
Large portions of participants within the beef industry have viewed such al-
ternative marketing arrangements with skepticism and have often pushed for
legislation to prohibit these arrangements. The most notable piece of leg-
islation was the proposed Johnson Amendment to the 2000 Farm Bill. The
amendment was not in the ﬁnal bill, and a similar amendment was introduced
but was not included in the 2008 Farm Bill, but there is persistent pressure
by populist groups to limit or prohibit non-cash market transactions in the
cattle industry8. We show in our paper that, from the meatpackers perspec-
tive, this pressure is misplaced in that alternative marketing agreement (a.k.a.
contract) cattle are generally part of an eﬃcient portfolio.
On the issue of competitive spot markets, Crespi and Sexton (2004) and
Schroeder and Azzam (2003 and 2004) provide a detailed examination of
a classic dataset collected by the USDA Grain Inspection and Packers and
Stockyards Administration. These data were comprehensive information col-
lected in the Texas Panhandle area where captive supplies are a substantial
proportion of total volumes and where some of the political pressure is the
greatest. Market power was found to be present, but its economic conse-
quences are minor to negligible. Like early structure-conduct-performance
research on industrial organization, diﬃculties in interpreting the empirical
research has lead to theoretical studies of the problem. Azzam (1998) is one
of the earliest studies and determines that the price impacts of captive sup-
plies are ambiguous due to relative changes in supply and demand of spot
market and non-spot market animals. Zhang and Sexton (2000 and 2001)
examine the role of transportation costs as a source of market power. Xia
and Sexton (2004) examine a theoretical model of top-of-the-market contract
pricing clauses that are most often used with alternative marketing agree-
ments. Wang and Jaenicke (2006) is the most recent research supported by
8There is a similar but weaker movement related to the use of non-cash market arrangements
in the pork-hog industry where the volume of these arrangements is more than double that
in the beef industry - based on the proportion of total industry volume accounted for by
non-cash arrangements. Policymakers appear to treat the issue within the beef industry
as unique to the beef industry and do not recognize that the practice of reliance on both
contract and spot markets is persistent in almost all commodity industries, as discussed in
Kleindorfer (2008).
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results derived through simulation. The authors ﬁnd that impacts of captive
supplies on cash market price are ambiguous. While all of these studies ﬁnd
the potential for market power through the strategic use of non-cash market
arrangements, few examine the potential eﬃciency beneﬁts that may come
with improved supply chain management, the focus of this paper. The excep-
tion is Love and Burton (1999) who build a model of captive supplies where
the packing ﬁrm has declining average costs of processing with its processing
facilities and an incentive to backward integrate to assure adequate supply to
take advantage of its economies of scale.
Against the background of the above literature, we can note several impor-
tant lacunae. For the upstream market, there is no research on the optimal
mix of procurement methods (contract vs. spot) within the beef industry.
Furthermore, the key issue of quality/yield risks (which are diﬀerent across
contract and spot procurement methods) needs to be addressed and integrated
with production and demand management. For the downstream market, the
key issue that needs to be addressed is that of multiple products arising from
processed beef (premium and standard products) and the demand uncertain-
ties and substitution eﬀects associated with these. It is precisely on these
key issues, and their related impacts on optimal processing decisions for the
producer (here the meatpacker), that we focus our model and our results.
1.3 MODEL DESCRIPTION
This section describes our modeling framework that is developed in Boya-
batlı et al. (2010). We consider a packer that procures and processes fed cat-
tle to produce two beef-products, a premium (program beef) and a standard
(commodity beef) product. We model the packer’s procurement, processing
and production decisions in a two-period framework. Before discussing the de-
tails of these decisions, we provide some notations that we will use throughout
the paper. A realization of the random variable 푦˜ is denoted by 푦. 피 denotes
the expectation operator, and bold face letters represent vectors of the re-
quired size. Vectors are column vectors and ′ denotes the transpose operator.
Monotonic relations are used in the weak sense unless otherwise stated. We
use“C-cattle” to denote the cattle sourced from the contract market and “S-
cattle” to denote the cattle sourced from the spot market.
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1.3.1 Procurement Decision
In line with the above discussion, we consider two sources for procurement,
marketing agreement contracts and spot markets. The marketing agreement
contract speciﬁes the number of C-cattle that are committed by the packer in
advance of the spot market and are delivered to the packer on the spot day.
The packer can also buy S-cattle from the spot market on the day. Let 푄퐶
denote the number of C-cattle and 푄푆(푃푆) denote the number of S-cattle at
the prevailing spot price 푃푆 . We assume that 푃˜푆 follows a normal distribution
with mean 휇푆 and standard deviation 휎푆 .
There are diﬀerences between C- and S-cattle in terms of meat quality,
processing cost and contract price. Processing C-cattle is cheaper and leads
to a higher yield of carcass meat suitable for producing the premium product
(where the additional yield is denoted as Δ). We will discuss these diﬀerences
in detail later in this section. C-cattle are priced through formula (a.k.a. grid)
pricing that tie the base price to publicly reported spot prices and specify
surcharge for high quality meat (MacDonald, 2003). In line with this, in our
model, the unit price of C-cattle is 푃푆 + 푣Δ and is based on the prevailing
spot price at the time of the delivery plus a surcharge (푣Δ) to reﬂect the
higher quality of C-cattle. The unit price of S-cattle is the prevailing spot
price 푃푆 with an additive transaction cost 푡 > 0 applied. This transaction
cost reﬂects transportation cost from the auction barn (spot market) to the
packers plant and weight loss between purchase and processing. The packer
can also sell C-cattle which it receives under contract in the spot market. The
unit sales price is (1− 휔)푃푆 where 0 < 휔 < 1 represents a transaction cost.
1.3.2 Processing Decision
Fed-cattle processing has two main characteristic features. First, packers have
high incentives to increase plant utilization due to signiﬁcant scale economies
(Ward and Schroeder 2002). Second, animal non-uniformity creates frictions
in cattle processing (Hennessy 2005); and C-cattle are more uniform than S-
cattle (Hayenga et al. 2000). We deﬁne z′ = (푧퐶 , 푧푆) as the vector of processed
cattle composed of C-cattle, 푧퐶 , and S-cattle, 푧푆 . We assume that there
exists a physical processing capacity constraint 퐾 (hereafter referred as plant
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size) such that 1′z ≤ 퐾; and the total processing cost is denoted by 퐶(z) =
푐01
′z+훿푧푆+푐1(퐾−1′z)2. Here, 푐0 is the common processing cost parameter,
훿 > 0 represents the additional processing cost of S-cattle due to animal
non-uniformity and 푐1 is a (quadratic) utilization cost parameter. As the
total processed cattle (1′z) increases, the average unit cost 퐶(z)1′z decreases. In
addition to the volume-variable costs, ﬁxed costs are also important elements
of the packer cost structure. They represent payments to capital providers
and indirect facility costs. We neglect these in the model development as they
do not aﬀect the optimal solution. Fixed costs are reﬂected in the calibration
underlying our numerical results in §1.4. Decreasing short-term average costs
throughout the entire range of feasible input levels are well documented and
important for packers in the beef industry (Koontz and Lawrence, 2010).
1.3.3 Production Decision
In the beef supply chain, beef products are grouped into two major categories,
program beef and commodity beef. Program beef is the premium product. In
our model, product 1 refers to program beef and product 2 refers to commodity
beef. Each unit (head) of processed cattle leads to carcass capacities in ﬁxed
proportions that can be used for production.
We denote 푎푗푖 as the ﬁxed proportion of the carcass for product 푖 = {1, 2}
from cattle type 푗 = {퐶, 푆}. We assume a′1 =
(
푎퐶1 , 푎
푆
1
)
< a′2 =
(
푎퐶2 , 푎
푆
2
)
, i.e.
carcass capacity is lower for the premium product than for the commodity
product, whatever the source of the carcass. We also assume 푎푗1 + 푎
푗
2 = 푠 ≤ 1
for 푗 ∈ {퐶, 푆}, i.e. the total carcass yield is identical for both cattle types
and there could be yield losses in processing (푠 < 1). To capture the quality
diﬀerence, we assume 푎퐶1 = 푎
푆
1 +Δ and 푎
퐶
2 = 푎
푆
2 −Δ where Δ ≥ 0 denotes the
quality diﬀerence of C-cattle. C-cattle have a higher carcass capacity for the
premium product. Since the total carcass capacity is ﬁxed, the proportion of
the standard product is higher with S-cattle.
The ﬁrm-speciﬁc demand for beef products is stochastic, price-dependent
and represented by the linear inverse-demand functions 푝1(x, 휉1) = 휉1−푏1푥11−
푒(푥22+푥12) and 푝2(x, 휉2) = 휉2−푏2(푥22+푥12)−푒푥11. Here, x′ = (푥11, 푥22, 푥12)
is the production vector, 푒 represents the cross-price elasticity parameter and
휉푖, 푏푖, 푝푖 denote the market size, own price slope of the demand function and
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price for product 푖 respectively. In the production vector x, 푥푘푙 denotes the
quantity of product 푙 produced from the meat capacity (a′kz = 푎
퐶
푘 푧
퐶 + 푎푆푘 푧
푆)
dedicated to product 푘. We assume that 흃′ = (휉1, 휉2) follows a bivariate nor-
mal distribution with mean vector 흃
′
= (휇1, 휇2) and covariance matrix Σ,
where Σ푖푖 = 휎
2
휉 and Σ푖푗 = 휌휉휎
2
휉 for 푖 ∕= 푗 and 휌휉 denotes the correlation
coeﬃcient. Since the ﬁrst product is premium product, we have 휇1 > 휇2, i.e.
for identical quantities, the expected price of the ﬁrst product is higher; and
푏1 > 푏2, i.e. the ﬁrst product demand is less responsive to changes in price
than the second product. In particular, we assume 푏2 < 푏1
푎푆1
푎푆2
. This is an ap-
propriate assumption for beef markets where price sensitivity is considerably
higher for premium products than for standard products.
We allow for two diﬀerent substitution channels for production. There ex-
ists demand substitution through the cross-price elasticity parameter 푒. Since
beef-products are natural substitutes, the price of each product is decreasing
in the price of the other product (푒 > 0) and this cross-price eﬀect is lower
than the own-price eﬀect (푒 < min(푏1, 푏2)). There is also downward product
substitution: the packer can produce standard product using the carcass ca-
pacity dedicated to premium product, and not vice versa. We assume that
the packer uses a market clearing pricing strategy, i.e. all the available carcass
is processed into one of other of the two beef products and price is adjusted
in proﬁt-maximizing fashion to sell all ﬁnished products.
1.3.4 The Model
We model the packer’s decision problem as a two-stage stochastic recourse
problem. In stage 0, the packer decides on the number of C-cattle (푄퐶) to
contract with respect to spot price 푃˜푆 and product market 흃˜ uncertainties.
At stage 1, these uncertainties are realized and 푄퐶 is delivered to the packer.
The packer decides on the number of cattle to buy from the spot market (푄푆),
the number of cattle to process out of the available S-cattle (푧푆) and C-cattle
(푧퐶), the number of cattle to sell back to the spot market (푄퐶+푄푆−푧퐶−푧푆)
and the production quantities of two beef products that either come from their
dedicated carcass capacities (푥11, 푥22), or through substitution of the premium
product carcass capacity to produce standard product (푥12). The objective
of the packer is to maximize the expected total proﬁt at stage 0.
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We now formulate the packer’s decision problem starting from stage 1:
max
푄푆 ,z,x
−푄퐶(푃푆 + 푣Δ)−푄푆(푃푆 + 푡) + (1− 휔)푃푆 [푄퐶 +푄푆 − 1′z] (1.1)
− [푐01′z + 훿푧푆 + 푐1(퐾 − 1′z)2]
+ 푥11
(
휉˜1 − 푏1푥11
)
+ (푥22 + 푥12)
(
휉˜2 − 푏2 (푥22 + 푥12)
)
− 2푒 (푥22 + 푥12)푥11
s.t. 푧퐶 ≤ 푄퐶 , 푧푆 ≤ 푄푆 , 1′z ≤ 퐾
푥11 + 푥12 = a
′
1z, 푥22 = a
′
2z
푄푆 ≥ 0, z ≥ 0, x ≥ 0.
In (1.1), the ﬁrst two terms represent the total procurement cost of the packer.
The third term is the revenue from spot market sales and the fourth term is the
total processing cost of the packer. The ﬁnal terms in the objective function
denote the sales revenue from the beef products. The ﬁrst two constraints
ensure that the packer does not process more than the available capacity of
a particular cattle type. The third constraint guarantees that the packer
processes within plant size. The fourth and the ﬁfth constraints represent the
available carcass capacity for each beef product under market clearing pricing
strategy. Let Π(푄퐶 ;푃푆 , 흃) denote the optimal stage 1 proﬁt for a given 푄퐶 .
Anticipating these decisions, at stage 0, the packer solves for the optimal
number of C-cattle to contract, 푄퐶
∗
, to maximize the expected ﬁrm proﬁt:
푉 ∗ = max푄퐶≥0 피
[
Π(푄퐶 ; 푃˜푆 , 흃˜)
]
where the expectation is taken over 푃˜푆
and 흃˜. We assume that the distributions of these two random variables are
statistically independent. To deal with the non-negativity of the market price,
we assume that the coeﬃcient of variations are not extremely large, and hence,
the eﬀect of negative values is negligible.
We refer the reader to Boyabatlı et al. (2010) for the explicit characteri-
zation of the optimal contracting decision. We close this section with an im-
portant observation about the eﬃciency of contract market in the beef supply
chain. As reported in Hayenga et al. (2000), packers note the following fac-
tors driving contract-market procurement: i) risk of not being able to obtain
cattle from the spot market, ii) non-uniformity of S-cattle and corresponding
higher processing costs, and iii) higher quality of C-cattle over S-cattle. In
parallel with this empirical observation, in our model, it is straightforward to
show that if there is no spot procurement transaction cost (푡 = 0), no addi-
16 PROCUREMENT RISK MANAGEMENT IN BEEF SUPPLY CHAINS
tional processing cost for S-cattle (훿 = 0) and no quality diﬀerence between
C-cattle and S-cattle (Δ = 0), then the packer does not contract any C-cattle.
In the next section, we shed more light on the the main drivers of the opti-
mal procurement portfolio as well as on several performance measures using
numerical experiments.
1.4 COMPUTATIONAL EXPERIMENTS FOR THE BEEF SUPPLY
CHAIN
This section describes computational results for the above model. Our pri-
mary objective is to provide insights on some fundamental intuitions about the
optimal integration of upstream contracting and downstream demand man-
agement. This section is calibrated on the typical packer, in terms of size
and cost characteristics, described in the GIPSA Report (2007), thus allow-
ing further insights into some of the controversies surrounding that important
study. The GIPSA data on packer characteristics were complemented by in-
dustry demand and supply studies. The GIPSA data pertain to the U.S. beef
industry for the period October 2002 through March 2005. We focus on an
average sized plant (see Tables 3.2, 3.3 and Figure 3.1 of the GIPSA Report)
with rated capacity of 25,000 head of cattle per week (corresponding to the
mean plant size of the GIPSA Report of 103,733 cattle per month as reported
in Table 3.2). Tables 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 provide the benchmark values for this
packer and the relevant range for the sensitivity analysis.
Spot and Contract Market Characteristics
Notation Description Benchmark Value Range
휔 Transaction cost in 4% of 푃푆 0% to 4% of 푃˜푆
spot sales (percentage) with 0.5% increments
푡 Transaction cost in 4% of 휇푆 ($64/head)
spot procurement
휇푆 Mean Spot Price $1600/head
휎푆 Spot Price Volatility 8% of 휇푆 (128) 4% to 9% of 휇푆 with 1% increments
푣 Surcharge parameter for ($4800/head) 2.5% to 4.25% of 휇푆 for surcharge
quality diﬀerence of C-cattle Δv=3.75% of 휇푆 (푣Δ) with 0.25% increments
Table 1.1 Description of the spot and contract market characteristics in
numerical studies.
The mean spot price 휇푆 is set to be $1600 (per head) and is in line with the
average auction barn (spot market) price of $1.32 per pound (with an average
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Processing Characteristics
Notation Description Benchmark Value Range
푐1 Utilization cost parameter $0.001 0, 0.001, 0.003, 0.005, 0.01,
0.015, 0.025, 0.05, 0.1
푐0 Common processing cost parameter $100/head 0 to 250 with 50 increments
훿 Non-uniformity cost of S-cattle $1.39/head 0 to 2.78 with 0.695 increments
퐾 Plant Size 25000 head/week
Table 1.2 Description of the processing characteristics in numerical studies.
Product Market Characteristics
Notation Description Benchmark Value Range
푒 Cross-price elasticity parameter 0.005 0 to 0.01 with
0.0025 increments
푏1 Own price coeﬃcient for program beef 0.035
푏2 Own price coeﬃcient for commodity beef 0.01
휇1 Mean demand of program beef 3800
휇2 Mean demand of commodity beef 3000
휎휉1 = 휎휉2 = 휎휉 Demand variability 6% of 휇2 (180) 3% to 8% of 휇2 with
1% increments
휌휉 Demand correlation 0.9 0.75 to 1 with
0.05 increments
푎푆1 Fixed proportion of program beef 0.18
with S-cattle processing
푎푆2 Fixed proportion of commodity beef 0.42
with S-cattle processing
Δ Quality Diﬀerence 0.0125 0 to 0.015 with
= 푎퐶1 − 푎푆1 = 푎푆2 − 푎퐶2 0.0025 increments
푠 Total proportion of usable carcass 0.60
= 푎퐶1 + 푎
퐶
2 = 푎
푆
1 + 푎
푆
2
Table 1.3 Description of the product market characteristics in numerical
studies.
weight of 1200 lbs per head) as reported in Table 5.1 . We set 휎푆 , spot
price variability to 8% of 휇푆 and is consistent with the reported variability
of average weekly prices in Table 5.1. The surcharge paid for the quality
diﬀerence of C-cattle, 푣Δ, is set such that the average procurement price of
C-cattle and S-cattle are identical as follows from Table 5.1 (the average price
of C- and S-cattle are reported as $1.32 per pound).
The GIPSA data on packer characteristics were complemented by industry
demand and supply studies. For example, 푡, transaction cost in spot procure-
ment, is set to be 4% of the mean spot price 휇푆 . This 4% represents the pencil
shrink on the cattle purchased from the spot market. The shrink is the water
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loss in the animal between the feedlot and packing plant. Since C-cattle tend
to be produced close to the plant, and the shrink is far less than the market
driven 4% and is reasonably close to (and set to be) zero.
On the cost calibration, we focus on 25000 head cattle processing, 50% of
which comes from the spot market (as consistent with the GIPSA Report).
We calculated average total cost (ATC), that is total processing cost divided
by the total quantity processed, at 95%, 75% and 50% utilization rates. The
benchmark ATC number (at 95% utilization) is $139 and is taken from Table
3.1 of the GIPSA Report. The cost estimation in the GIPSA Report illustrates
that a plant operating at 75% utilization rate has an ATC that is 6% higher
than the benchmark ATC; and a plant operating at 50% utilization rate has
an ATC that is 14% higher than the benchmark ATC. Moreover, the increase
in ATC is more signiﬁcant at lower utilization rates. The non-uniformity cost
훿 corresponds to the 1% of the benchmark ATC. Finally, ﬁxed facility costs
of 900퐾 per week were assumed, representing ﬁxed staﬃng and maintenance
costs and payments to investors, which is representative of the range of ﬁxed
costs of medium-sized U.S. plants. To determine the ﬁnal calibration, we
minimized the sum of the quadratic diﬀerence between the estimated and
the speciﬁed target ATC values at 95%, 75% and 50% utilization rates. The
resulting cost parameters (ﬁxed cost, 훿, 푐0 and 푐1) provide a good ﬁt to the
observed pattern above.
On the demand calibration, since the beef product demands are highly cor-
related, we set 휌휉 to be 0.9. Since demand variability is lower than the spot
price variability, as consistently observed in the beef markets, we set 휎휉 to be
6% of the mean demand of the standard product (휇2). The demand param-
eters, own price coeﬃcients 푏1 and 푏2, and cross-price elasticity parameter 푒,
are set to be suﬃciently low such that the ﬁrm-speciﬁc price elasticity of de-
mand is large. With the resulting set of parameters, the expected beef price
(calculated from expected price of each product rated by its corresponding
ﬁxed proportion) is calculated as $2.60 per pound. This is consistent with the
average beef price reported in Table 1.4 of the GIPSA Report (The reported
gross price is $2.62 and the net price is $2.57). The expected proﬁt of the
packer is calculated as $2.04 million per week, and corresponds to 5.6% of the
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total sales revenues from two beef markets. These two proﬁt measures are
representative features of a medium-size packer in the beef industry.
As ﬁnal validation tests of the model calibration, we analyze the optimal
sourcing portfolio, expected utilization and the expected spot selling of the C-
cattle. As depicted in Figure 1.3, in the period of the GIPSA study (October
2002 to March 2005), the ratio of spot procurement is higher than, yet close to,
the contract procurement. At the benchmark parameter values, the optimal
sourcing portfolio is composed of 41.6% contract market procurement and
58.4% spot market procurement. This is consistent with the observed pattern
in Figure 1.3.
Figure 1.3 Sourcing Classiﬁcation of Fed cattle Procurement in Beef Supply
Chains: Here, “cash” refers to spot market procurement; and “formula” refers to
the marketing agreement contracts.
The expected utilization of the packer is calculated to be 77% and the
expected spot sales ratio (the ratio of expected spot number of C-cattle sold
back to the spot market to the total C-cattle) is 2.2%, i.e. the packer almost
always uses C-cattle for processing. These two numbers are also consistent
with the characteristics of a medium-size packer in the beef industry.
For computational experiments, we programmed the ﬁrst-order-condition
and the other performance measures in MATLAB. We validated the code
against a number of tests that included making comparisons between the
MATLAB results and i) explicitly calculated optimal values for the perfor-
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mance measures when 흃˜ and 푃˜푆 equaled their mean values (in this case, 휎휉
and 휎푆 were assigned very low values so that all the probability mass was lo-
cated at the mean); ii) results of several special cases of the problem for which
we analytically know the behavior of the optimal performance measures (for
example, for 휔 = 푣 = 0 we have 푄퐶
∗
= 퐾), and iii) a number of comparative
static results that can be proven analytically (for example, 푄퐶
∗
is decreasing
in 휔).
A number of performance measures were computed for the experiments
reported here, all of them evaluated at the optimal solution to the packer’s
expected proﬁt maximization problem. Speciﬁcally, we report:
PERF-1. The optimal volume of C-cattle to contract: 푄퐶
∗
PERF-2. Expected spot procurement at the optimal solution: 피[푄푆∗]
PERF-3. Optimal portfolio (contract intensity) ratio: 푄
퐶∗
푄퐶∗+피[푄푆∗]
PERF-4. Expected optimal proﬁt of the packer: 피[Π∗]: This includes $900,000
in ﬁxed costs (including payments to owners/investors) per week.
PERF-5. Value of contract market: 피[Π
∗(푄퐶∗)]−피[Π∗(0)]
피[Π∗(푄퐶∗)] . This captures the
relative value loss between the packer using the optimal number of contracts
and the packer not using any contracts.
PERF-6. Value of spot market: 피[Π
∗(푄퐶∗)]−피[Π∗(푄퐶∗∣푡→∞,휔→1)]
피[Π∗(푄퐶∗)] . This cap-
tures the relative value loss between the packer using the optimal number of
contracts (with spot involvement) and the packer using the optimal number
of contracts (without spot involvement).
PERF-7. Expected capacity utilization of the packer’s plant: 피[푧
∗]
퐾 where 푧
∗
denotes the optimal processing volume at stage 1.
To illustrate the impact of the various parameters of interest from Tables
1.1, 1.2 and 1.3, we ﬁrst compute the elasticity of the performance measure
with respect to each of the parameters, for a variation of ±5% around the
benchmark case. Elasticity of performance metric “F” w.r.t. parameter“p”
is deﬁned as ∂퐹∂푝 × 푝퐹 , and therefore represents the percentage change in F
arising from a one percentage point change in p. The results of this exercise
are shown in Table 1.4. Second, we numerically analyze the impact of these
parameters over their entire range as speciﬁed in Tables 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3. The
arrows in the cells in Table 1.4 indicate these results. Some of these results
are non-monotonic. In these cases, we demonstrate the impact with multiple
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arrows in the order of observation as the parameter of interest increases. For
example, ↓↑ implies that the particular performance metric ﬁrst decreases
then increases with an increase in the parameter of interest.
Contract Spot Portfolio Proﬁt C- Value S- Value Utilization
PERF-1 PERF-2 PERF-3 PERF-4 PERF-5 PERF-6 PERF-7
푐0
-1.13804 0.419687 -0.90230 -0.59950 -1.41721 2.11155 -0.25744
↓ ↑↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↑ ↓
푒
-0.19233 0.035710 -0.13331 -0.10353 -0.14660 0.48714 -0.05842
↓ ↑ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↑ ↓
훿
0.10003 -0.062454 0.09516 -0.00507 0.26556 -0.02956 0.00336
↑ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↑
Δ
-3.72820 3.086226 -3.52313 -0.13318 -6.58813 2.35207 -0.26155
↓ ↑ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↑ ↑↓
휔
-0.48103 0.148112 -0.46067 -0.00347 -0.80789 -0.01457 -0.00913
↓ ↑ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↑
푣
-6.69295 3.439525 -6.56454 -0.08706 -8.83006 2.23974 -0.31326
↓ ↑ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↑
푐1
0.42442 -0.194364 0.36397 -0.02799 0.97425 -0.16225 0.05766
↑ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓↑ ↑
휎푆
-2.07179 0.614115 -1.93687 0.19425 -3.86640 0.84328 -0.15958
↓ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓
휎휉
-0.99127 0.545250 -0.87836 0.13939 -2.04259 0.84293 -0.12723
↓ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓
휌휉
-0.20042 0.103052 -0.17646 0.02742 -0.43698 0.16120 -0.02517
↓ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓
Table 1.4 Impact of Parameters on The Performance Measures
As an example, consider the impact of Δ on푄퐶
∗
in Table 1.4. The elasticity
of 푄퐶
∗
w.r.t. Δ is given as −3.72820. Noting the linear approximation being
used here to estimate elasticities, this means that, in the neighborhood of
the Base Case, an increase in Δ of 1% would lead to a 3.72820% decrease
in 푄퐶
∗
, ceteris paribus. This monotonic behavior is also observed over the
entire range of Δ as depicted by ↓. An increase in Δ has two eﬀects: ﬁrst,
it increases the fraction of premium product in C-cattle with positive proﬁt
impacts given the higher price for the premium product; second, it increases
the surcharge paid over the spot price for C-cattle (with the surcharge equal
to 푣Δ). Given the value of 푣 in the market, the second eﬀect dominates the
ﬁrst in our numerical experiments.
As can be seen further in Table 1.4, an increase in Δ would lead to an
increase in spot procurement, a decrease in the contract intensity ratio, a
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decrease in expected proﬁts, a decrease in the value of the contract market
and an increase in the value of the spot market. The impact on the expected
capacity utilization is non-monotonic. When Δ (thus, the surcharge) is suf-
ﬁciently low, the ﬁrm contracts up to the plant size. In this case, expected
processing quantity 피[푧∗] increases in Δ as higher price for the premium prod-
uct induces the packer to process more of C-cattle (and sell less of it to the
spot). Therefore, expected utilization increases. When Δ is suﬃciently high,
the ﬁrm does not contract up to plant size. In this case, a higher Δ decreases
푄퐶
∗
and expected utilization decreases.
Rather than dwell on the rationale and intuition for each of the results
shown in Table 1.4, we focus on the eﬀects of input and output price variability,
contract market transaction costs, quality diﬀerence between C- and S-cattle,
utilization cost parameter, and product and demand substitution.
1.4.1 Eﬀect of Spot Price and Product Market Variability
In this section, we analyze the eﬀect of spot price variability (휎푆) and product
market variability (휎휉, 휌휉) on the key performance indicators. For brevity, on
the impact of product market variability, we will only provide ﬁgures for 휎휉.
As depicted in Panel A of Figure 1.4, 푄퐶
∗
decreases in 휎푆 . In our numerical
experiments, we observe that the packer almost never sells C-cattle back to
the spot market. Therefore, the impact of the spot price variability on the
optimal contract volume is through its impact on the spot procurement. Since
the packer only buys from spot market when spot price is suﬃciently low, with
a higher 휎푆 , the packer beneﬁts from low spot price realizations by procuring
S-cattle cheaper, whereas the packer is not aﬀected from the high spot price
realizations. Therefore, the packer’s reliance on S-cattle increases, and in
turn, 푄퐶
∗
decreases.
For the eﬀect of 휎휉 and 휌휉 on 푄
퐶∗, we note here that a higher 휎휉 or 휌휉
increases the variability of product market returns. For 휌휉, this is because a
higher correlation decreases the diversiﬁcation beneﬁt from operating in two
markets. Since C-cattle is always processed (and is not sold back to the spot
market), the change in the variability of product market returns does not have
an impact on the expected marginal value of processing the C-cattle. On the
other hand, the packer processes S-cattle (after all the C-cattle is processed)
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Figure 1.4 Impact of Spot Price Variability (휎푆) and Product Market Variability
(휎휉) on the Optimal Procurement Portfolio: 휎푆 ranges from 4% to 9% of the mean
spot price (휇푆) with 1% increments and 휎휉 ranges from 3% to 8% of the mean
demand of the standard product (휇2) with 1% increments.
only if the product market return is suﬃciently high. In other words, with
a higher 휎휉 or 휌휉, the S-cattle processing beneﬁts from the higher variability
in product market returns. Since the packer relies more on the S-cattle, 푄퐶
∗
decreases. The result with respect to 휎휉 is depicted in Panel A of Figure 1.4.
We now analyze the eﬀect of variability on the expected spot procurement.
As depicted in Panel B of Figure 1.4, with a higher 휎푆 or 휎휉, expected spot
procurement increases. The same holds true with an increase in 휌휉. These
results are driven by two eﬀects: First, S-cattle processing beneﬁts from a
higher 휎푆 (a higher 휎휉 or 휌휉). This is because the packer optimally processes S-
cattle only when the spot price is suﬃciently low (or the product market return
is suﬃciently high). Second, 푄퐶
∗
decreases and the packer relies more on the
spot procurement. As 푄퐶
∗
decreases and the expected spot procurement
increases, the optimal portfolio ratio decreases in 휎푆 and 휎휉 as depicted in
Panel C of Figure 1.4. The same holds true with an increase in 휌휉.
For the impact on the expected proﬁt, we ﬁrst analyze the eﬀect of 휎푆 . The
packer has two options on the spot market: spot selling and spot procurement.
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As we pointed out above, expected spot selling is very small in the optimal
solution within our numerical setting. Since the packer optimally procures
from the spot market only if the spot price is suﬃciently low, the value of spot
procurement increases in 휎푆 . Therefore, the expected ﬁrm proﬁt increases in
휎푆 as depicted in Panel A of Figure 1.5. The eﬀect of 휎휉 and 휌휉 on the
expected ﬁrm proﬁt is driven by the value of the processing option of the
ﬁrm. Since the ﬁrm optimally processes only when product market return is
suﬃciently high, a higher variability of product market return, i.e. a higher
휎휉 or 휌휉, increases the value of processing option of the packer, and thus, the
expected optimal proﬁt. The result with respect to 휎휉 is depicted in Panel A
of Figure 1.5.
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Figure 1.5 Impact of Spot Price Variability (휎푆) and Product Market Variability
(휎휉) on the Expected Firm Proﬁt, Value of Contract and Spot Market and Expected
Utilization: 휎푆 ranges from 4% to 9% of the mean spot price (휇푆) with 1%
increments and 휎휉 ranges from 3% to 8% of the mean demand of the standard
product (휇2) with 1% increments.
With an increase in 휎푆 or 휎휉, a lower (higher) dependence on contract
(spot) market leads to a lower (higher) value of contract (spot) market as
depicted in Panel B (C) of Figure 1.5. The reduction in the volume of C-
cattle processing dominates the increase in the volume of S-cattle processing
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and the expected total number of input processed decreases. As a result,
expected utilization decreases (Panel D). These results continue to hold with
an increase in 휌휉.
1.4.2 Eﬀect of Contract Market Transaction Costs (풗 and 흎)
In this section, we analyze the eﬀect of the transaction cost for spot sales (휔)
and the value surcharge for the quality diﬀerence of C-cattle (푣) on the key
performance indicators. As 휔 increases, the value of spot resale of the C-cattle
decreases. As 푣 increases, the contract procurement cost increases. Therefore,
as depicted in Panel A of Figure 1.6 below, with an increase in 휔 or 푣, the
optimal contract volume decreases. In turn, the expected spot procurement
increases (Panel B) and the optimal portfolio ratio decreases (Panel C).
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Figure 1.6 Impact of Transaction Cost in Spot Sales (휔) and Surcharge for High
Quality Carcass (푣) on the Optimal Procurement Portfolio: 휔 ranges from 0% to
4% with 0.5% increments and 푣 ranges from 3200 to 5440 with 320 increments (or
equivalently, the quality premium 푣Δ ranges from 2.5% to 4.25% of the mean spot
price 휇푆 with 0.25% increments).
The increase in the contract procurement cost (with an increase in 푣) and
the decrease in the proﬁtability of spot resale (with an increase in 휔) decreases
the expected ﬁrm proﬁt as depicted in Panel A of Figure 1.7. With an increase
in 푣 or 휔, a lower (higher) dependence on the contract (spot) market leads
to a lower (higher) value of the contract (spot) market as observed in Panel
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B (Panel C). The decrease in the volume of C-cattle processing outweighs
the increase in the volume of S-cattle processing and the expected utilization
decreases (Panel D).
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Figure 1.7 Impact of Transaction Cost in Spot Sales (휔) and Surcharge for
High Quality Carcass (푣) on the Expected Firm Proﬁt, Value of Contract and Spot
Market and Expected Utilization: 휔 ranges from 0% to 4% with 0.5% increments
and 푣 ranges from 3200 to 5440 with 320 increments (or equivalently, the quality
premium 푣Δ ranges from 2.5% to 4.25% of the mean spot price 휇푆 with 0.25%
increments).
1.4.3 Eﬀect of Quality Diﬀerence between C-cattle and S-cattle (Δ)
As Δ increases, there are two opposite eﬀects, the cost eﬀect and the rev-
enue eﬀect. On the cost side, the contract procurement cost increases as the
additional surcharge is tied to Δ. On the revenue side, the premium (stan-
dard) product yield from C-cattle increases (decreases). Consistent with the
practice, in our numerical experiments, we observe that the premium product
market is more proﬁtable than the standard product market. Therefore, a
higher Δ increases the value of C-cattle processing.
As depicted in Panel A of Figure 1.8, with an increase in Δ, the cost eﬀect
dominates the revenue eﬀect and 푄퐶
∗
decreases. For a given 푄퐶 , expected
spot procurement is independent of Δ. Since 푄퐶
∗
decreases, the expected
spot procurement increases (Panel B) and the optimal portfolio ratio decreases
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(Panel C). It is interesting to note that even when there is no quality diﬀer-
ence (Δ = 0), the packer optimally contracts up to full capacity 퐾. Despite
the early commitment requirement of contract procurement, additional non-
uniformity processing cost 훿 and transaction cost 푡 of S-cattle together with
the low level spot resale transaction cost 휔 induce the packer to prefer C-cattle
over S-cattle.
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Figure 1.8 Impact of Quality Diﬀerence (Δ) on the Optimal Procurement
Portfolio: Δ ranges from 0 to 0.015 with 0.0025 increments.
For the eﬀect on the expected proﬁt, the cost eﬀect dominates the revenue
eﬀect and the expected proﬁt decreases with an increase in Δ as depicted in
Panel A of Figure 1.9. A lower (higher) dependence on the contract (spot)
market leads to a lower (higher) value of the contract (spot) market (Panel
B). The expected utilization ﬁrst increases then decreases as shown in Panel
C. For signiﬁcantly low levels of Δ, the packer optimally contracts up to the
full plant capacity and there is no spot procurement. In this case, an increase
in Δ increases the value of C-cattle processing and a lower volume of C-cattle
is sold to the spot market. Therefore, the expected utilization increases. For
higher levels of Δ, the packer contracts less than the plant capacity and relies
on the spot procurement. In this case, with an increase in Δ, the decrease
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in the volume of C-cattle processing outweighs the increase in the volume of
S-cattle processing and the expected utilization decreases.
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Figure 1.9 Impact of Quality Diﬀerence (Δ) on the Expected Firm Proﬁt, Value
of Contract and Spot Market and Expected Utilization: Δ ranges from 0 to 0.015
with 0.0025 increments.
1.4.4 Eﬀect of Utilization Cost Parameter 풄1
As depicted in Panel A of Figure 1.10, a higher 푐1 increases the optimal
volume of C-cattle: As the cost of underutilization of the plant capacity 퐾
increases, the packer contracts more to lessen the impact of underutilization.
In other words, the contract market provides a hedge against increasing uti-
lization penalty cost. Although for a given 푄퐶 the expected spot procurement
would increase for the same reason, a higher 푄퐶
∗
decreases the expected spot
procurement. Therefore, the optimal portfolio ratio increases (Panel C).
A higher 푐1 decreases the expected proﬁt as depicted in Panel A of Figure
1.11. Since the ﬁrm relies more (less) on the contract (spot) market with an
increase in 푐1, the value of the contract (spot) market increases (decreases)
as shown in Panel B (Panel C). Since the packer almost never sells back the
C-cattle to the spot market, and uses C-cattle for processing; with an increase
in 푐1, the increase in the volume of processed C-cattle outweighs the decrease
in the volume of S-cattle and the expected utilization increases as depicted in
Panel D.
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Figure 1.10 Impact of Utilization Cost Parameter (푐1) on
the Optimal Procurement Portfolio: 푐1 range is in the set of
{0, 0.001, 0.003, 0.005, 0.01, 0.015, 0.025, 0.05, 0.1}.
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Figure 1.11 Impact of Utilization Cost Parameter (푐1) on the Optimal
Procurement Portfolio and Expected Firm Proﬁt: 푐1 range is in the set of
{0, 0.001, 0.003, 0.005, 0.01, 0.015, 0.025, 0.05, 0.1}.
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1.4.5 Eﬀect of Demand and Product Substitution
The eﬀect of demand substitution (through the cross-price elasticity parameter
푒) is driven by the change in the product market proﬁtability, and hence the
value of processing. As 푒 increases, since the two outputs are substitutes, for
ﬁxed production levels, the price of each product decreases. This leads to a
lower product market proﬁtability as the ﬁrm is not able to price diﬀerentiate
between the two markets due to the higher cross-price eﬀect. Therefore, higher
demand substitution decreases the value of processing. It follows that 푄퐶
∗
decreases with an increase in 푒, as depicted in Panel A of Figure 1.12 below.
Although for a given 푄퐶 , the expected spot procurement decreases in 푒 due
to lower value of processing, the reduction in 푄퐶
∗
leads to an increase in the
expected spot procurement (Panel B). Therefore the optimal portfolio ratio
decreases (Panel C).
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Figure 1.12 Impact of Demand Substitution (through cross-price elasticity
parameter 푒) on the Optimal Procurement Portfolio: 푒 ranges from 0 to 0.01 with
0.0025 increments.
As depicted in Panel A of Figure 1.13 below, with an increase in the cross-
price elasticity parameter 푒, a lower value of processing decreases the expected
ﬁrm proﬁt. A lower (higher) dependence on the contract (spot) procurement
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leads to a lower (higher) value of the contract (spot) market as depicted in
Panel B. The decrease in the volume of C-cattle processing outweighs the
increase in the volume of S-cattle processing and the expected utilization
decreases (Panel C).
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Figure 1.13 Impact of Demand Substitution (through cross-price elasticity
parameter 푒) on Expected Firm Proﬁt, Value of Contract and Spot Market and
Expected Utilization: 푒 ranges from 0 to 0.01 with 0.0025 increments.
The eﬀect of product substitution is driven by the product substitution
regime used by the ﬁrm. To understand the extent of product substitution, we
explicitly calculate the expected premium product substitution ratio
피[푥∗12]
피[푥∗11+푥∗12]
in our numerical experiments. However, product substitution does not have
any value for the calibration implied by the GIPSA data; for this data the
ﬁrm optimally does not use any product substitution. This observation is
consistent with empirical observations, as packers rarely convert premium
product (program beef) to standard product (commodity beef) in practice.
We note here that the ineﬀectiveness of product substitution partly depends
on the high value of product market correlation 휌휉. The optimal substitution
regime is determined by the diﬀerence between two market prospects. As
demand correlation decreases, the asymmetry between the two markets in-
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creases, and the ﬁrm starts using partial and full product substitution regimes.
As depicted in Figure 1.14 below, the expected premium product substitution
ratio increases with a decrease in 휌휉 for suﬃciently negative correlation levels.
In this case, product substitution does have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the key
performance measures.
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Figure 1.14 Impact of Demand Correlation (휌휉) on the Optimal Expected
Product 1 Substitution Ratio
(
피[푥∗12]
피[푥∗11+푥∗12]
)
: 휌휉 ranges from -1 to 1 with 0.25
increments.
1.5 DISCUSSION
Our results provide insights on several open questions of importance to the
beef industry, including the eﬃciency and value of contract markets, which
has been a fundamental bone of contention in the beef industry for decades.
Among others, we have the following managerial insights. Lower variability
in the input and output markets increases the value of the contract market
relative to the spot market. Thus, the packer should increase the contract
procurement with a decrease in variability. Interestingly, the packer does not
beneﬁt from lower variability. This is because the packer makes money out
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of the uncertainties in the market place (both spot and product market).
Since the ﬁrm optimally responds to such uncertainties, lower variability in
the markets decreases expected proﬁts (in the usual spirit of real options). A
higher quality diﬀerence between fed cattle sourced from contract and spot
market does not necessarily beneﬁt the packer, as this diﬀerence is reﬂected
in the surcharge premium of the contract price. When the packer faces an
increase in the utilization penalty costs, the contract market should be used
more extensively to secure processing volume to hedge against the increasing
processing costs.
It is important to bear in mind that the calibration for the numerical
studies reported was undertaken at mean values of the parameters reported
for the period October 2002 to March 2005. For this base case, the value
of the contract market was not high (see Table 1.4). However, there were
signiﬁcant periods during the time frame of the GIPSA study in which the
input and output market parameters dictated a much higher value of contract
markets, as our sensitivity analysis indicated (e.g., the impact of 휎푆 and 휎휉).
Indeed, central to understanding the value of the contract market for packers
is the variability in market parameters across time and the relative ﬁxedness of
packer technology and cost structures. The ﬂexibility accorded by increased
sourcing alternatives, including the contract market, is therefore extremely
important in responding to market ﬂuctuations over the life of the packer’s
plant.
The usual caveats apply in interpreting the results of a single set of parame-
ters. Even with this caveat in mind, what is apparent in the present context is
the richness of the interactions across various drivers of the key performance
indicators. One of the most important elements of the beef context is the
fact that, as is typical in fed-cattle markets, contract prices and spot prices
are closely linked through the standard contract. Even with this close link,
the sensitivity of the optimal portfolio to variability in both upstream and
downstream markets is signiﬁcant (e.g., see Table 1.4). What this indicates
is a strong interaction among upstream and downstream factors. This is all
the more evident when considering the impact on optimal contracts, proﬁts
and utilization from the other factors characterizing these markets. For ex-
ample, changes in quality determinants of the contract (captured in Δ) can
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have signiﬁcant impacts on the optimal portfolio. Of course, the main drivers
of the optimal portfolio are the mean values of prices of contract and spot
cattle, and the price sensitivity and variability in the ﬁnal product markets.
All of these vary considerably over time depending on supply and demand
of the respective cattle entering into these two markets (e.g., See Figure 2.1
and the ensuing discussion in the GIPSA Report (2007), which describes very
signiﬁcant changes over time in prices in the U.S. beef industry during the
period 2002-2005 of that study). As a result, what one can expect is that
the optimal portfolio, and the value of the contract market itself, will change
over time, and at times dramatically, as determinants of supply-demand and
prices change. This is consistent with the basic story of this paper and other
contributions to supply management under risk: namely, there is real value
in the integration of risk management, production and marketing, and all the
more so under conditions of varying environmental conditions and ﬁxed plant
size and technology.
There are a number of limitations to the present study. The model analyzed
reﬂects the speciﬁc characteristics of the U.S. beef market, which has a number
of idiosyncrasies, including the pricing of contract procurement relative to the
spot market. In other contexts, the price in the contract purchases could well
be ﬁxed and/or subject to other determining factors (e.g., the competitive
model developed in Wu and Kleindorfer (2005)). Moreover, even for other
live animal supply chains, such as pork-hog and broiler-chicken, there are
important diﬀerences from the beef market (e.g., for the pork-hog market,
one would see a higher proportion of the premium product, i.e. 푎1 > 푎2, in
contrast to the beef supply chain, and the optimal operating regime would
be diﬀerent with important consequences for diﬀerent substitution results).
These comments and noted limitations suggest a number of open research
questions.
There are several empirical avenues that are opened by the results of this
study. These include both comparisons of diﬀerent size plants, and of the
performance and structure of sourcing portfolios as market conditions vary.
In addition to these matters of direct interest to both industry and policy
makers, there are also other interesting features in the model presented that
deserve empirical study. These include the eﬀect of contracting terms (such
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as options and resale value parameters), utilization and scale eﬀects (which
are reported to be extremely important in packer decisions), and the impact
of price level and volatility on spot and contract cattle purchasing decisions.
These are all very interesting for the beef industry. In addition, other eﬀects
modeled here, such as product and demand substitution, may be even more
important in other markets.
Concerning risk management, our focus has been on physical procurement
only. Extensions to overlay the cash ﬂows from this physical problem with
ﬁnancial hedging are an important area of future research. In the beef indus-
try, for example, there are signiﬁcant variations over time in market conditions
and operating proﬁts of meat packers. To the extent that proﬁt smoothing
would avoid ﬁnancial transactions costs under such variable market condi-
tions, ﬁnancial hedging can be of signiﬁcant value. Financial options deﬁned
on either input or output markets can serve this purpose. As noted in Klein-
dorfer (2008), these hedge markets need not be identical with the sourcing
markets as long as they are suﬃciently highly correlated with these markets.
In addition to short-term issues, there are also important capacity invest-
ment and technology choice issues in the longer term. Intuitively, it is clear
that the tradeoﬀs involved between scale economies, operational ﬂexibility (in
downward substitution and yields) are likely to be richer and more complex
in a ﬁxed proportions technology world than in a single-input, single-output
world. From the numerical analysis in this paper, we already see that these
tradeoﬀs will involve complex interactions between the magnitude of the scale
economies and the entire fabric of the short-term optimization problem (solved
here for the beef market) given capacities. A deeper examination of these with
an appropriate temporal separation between capacity/technology choices and
shorter term operating and contracting choices would be interesting.
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